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I. DEFINITION OF JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

This contribution will examine whether or not there exist jurisdictional
conflicts between international tribunals operating under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the courts of the United States of
America, one of the three NAFTA member states. It will be useful first to
identify the perceived jurisdictional conflict before investigating whether or not
there exists such a conflict at present. We are dealing here with a situation
where a non-U.S. claimant in an international proceeding under NAFTAs
Chapter 11 complains of a violation of international law founded upon a U.S.
judicial act, i.e., one or more decisions of a court, or courts, of the United States.
The judicial act essentially constitutes the NAFTA member state's "measure"
complained of. This situation must be distinguished from the one in which the
*
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action challenged is that of another branch of government, as in the case of ADF
Group Inc. v. U.S.A.'
Is there a problem here? In other words, is there a trend of domestic cases
brought as NAFTA cases that should be of concern? As with so many legal
problems, there is more to it than initially meets the eye.
As the Tribunal in the Mondev Case, discussed below, explicitly
recognized, 2 NAFTA tribunals are faced here with a tension between the
following two considerations: International tribunals are not courts of appeal;
and NAFTAs Chapter 11 is intended to provide a real measure of protection for
foreign investors.
The critical questions that must be asked in this context are threefold.
First, is the NAFTA claim in substance an original, or un-remedied, appeal from
a municipal decision, or was there true judicial finality? Second, is the NAFTA
claimant in essence a foreign party or, rather, a U.S. party? Third, does the
NAFTA claim present a colorable case under international law, i.e., is there
primafacieevidence of a breach of international law constituted by a municipal
judicial act?
In investigating whether or not the NAFTA case law points to a problem,
it is necessary to distinguish the following two scenarios: Is the judicial act
challenged that of a lower municipal court (as in the Loewen Case); or is the
judicial act challenged that of the NAFTA member state's highest judicial
authority (as in the Mondev Case)?
Assuming that the requirement of diversity of nationality under NAFTA
Article 1139 is met, the NAFTA claim might be in substance an improper
appeal from a municipal court decision in case of a failure to exhaust local
remedies (usually implicated by a failure to file a writ of certiorariin the U.S.
Supreme Court), or in the absence of a colorable international law claim.

II. NAFTA CASE LAW
Given that the Mondev and Loewen Cases have been referred to as
possibly presenting ajurisdictional conflict between NAFTA tribunals and U.S.
courts, we will concentrate on these two cases below. A summary of the facts
in each of these cases will assist in clarifying their meaning in the present
context.

I.
ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (2003),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ADF-award.pdf.
2.
Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 LL.M. 85
(2003), 1127 (2002).
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A. The Mondev Case

The Mondev Case was brought by a Canadian investor against the U.S.
under the "Additional Facility" Rules of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Canada not being a party to the ICSID
Convention. The case arose from a failed Boston real estate investment by the
Canadian investor through its U.S. subsidiary, a Massachusetts limited partnership. The U.S. subsidiary obtained ajury verdict against the City of Boston and
the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) in the Massachusetts Superior
Court. The court ruled, however, that the BRA was immune from liability for
interference with contractual relations based on a Massachusetts statute. Both
the City of Boston and the U.S. subsidiary appealed the lower court's ruling.
Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's ruling with
regard to the BRA and also overturned the jury verdict against the City. The
U.S. subsidiary's petition for a writ of certiorari filed in the U.S. Supreme
Court in respect of the contract claim against the City of Boston was denied
without giving any reasons, as was its petition for rehearing before
Massachusetts' highest court. These decisions effectively put an end to the U.S.
subsidiary's claims under Massachusetts law.
The Canadian investor then brought a proceeding under NAFTAs Chapter
11 alleging U.S. violations of Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105
(Minimum Standard of Treatment), and 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation), and claiming some fifty million in damages caused to its interests in the
U.S. subsidiary.3 The essence of the Canadian investor's complaint was that the
U.S. courts had frustrated its compensation in respect of a failed investment.
In its Award of October 11, 2002, the NAFTA Tribunal allowed as the
basis of Mondev's claim under NAFTA only the conduct of the U.S. courts in
dismissing the U.S. subsidiary's claims (Art. 11 05(l))." In the circumstances,
the case turned on the presence or absence of a denial of justice by the U.S.
courts. Finding no evidence of such a denial of justice under contemporary
international law in the circumstances, the NAFTA Tribunal dismissed
Mondev's claims in their entirety.
B. The Loewen Case'
The Loewen Case also was an ICSID Additional Facility case brought by
a Canadian investor against the U.S. Loewen's case rested on the judgment and
judicial orders of a Mississippi trial court and the Mississippi Supreme Court,
which judicial acts were alleged to be the relevant government measures under
3.
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NAFTA Chapter 11 and were alleged to have violated NAFTA Articles 1102,
1105, and 1110. The dispute arose from litigation involving a local funeral
home and funeral insurance business in Mississippi State Court against Loewen.
This litigation resulted in a $500 million jury award against Loewen, by far the
largest verdict ever awarded in Mississippi. The value of the underlying
contract in dispute was a mere $980,000. Loewen did not pursue an appeal in
light of Mississippi State court decisions refusing to relax excessive bond
requirements (125% of the jury award) as a condition to an appeal. Loewen also
did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Loewen finally agreed to settle the Mississippi case for $175 million.
Subsequently, it initiated a proceeding under NAFTAs Chapter 11.
In June 2003, the NAFTA Tribunal dismissed Loewen's claim based on its
failure to show that it had no reasonably available and adequate remedy under
U.S. municipal law in respect of the matters of which it complained.
C. Inconsistent Rulings?
In the light of the facts of these cases, it may be asked: Did the Mondev
and Loewen Tribunals provide openings that should concern or disturb us? The
Mondev Tribunal did express "some sympathy for Mondev's situation" and
found it "implicit in the jury's verdict that there was a campaign by Boston ...
to avoid contractual commitments freely entered into." Yet it dismissed
Mondev's NAFTA claims. To soften the pain, the Tribunal did not make any
order for costs or expenses.
Even though the Loewen Tribunal concluded that there had been a
miscarriage ofjustice by the courts of the U.S. State of Mississippi vis-6-vis the
Canadian investor, including the trial court's failure to take control of the trial,
it still decided not to "use the [NAFTA] weapons at hand to put it right." It did
so even after asking itself the following rhetorical question: "What clearer case
than the present could there be for the ideals of NAFTA to be given some
teeth?" 7
In order fully to understand the rulings of the NAFTA Tribunals in the
Mondev and Loewen Cases, which appear to be sound from an international law
perspective, it will be necessary to examine the international law concepts
underlying them, in particular those of attribution and exhaustion of local
remedies, before a proper evaluation may be made.

6.

Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 I.L.M. at 116.

7.

Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 850.

2005]

Bekker
III. THE POSITION UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Attribution
It is well-settled under general international law that the unlawful actions
of the U.S. courts, which constitute organs of the U.S. for purposes of international law, entail the U.S.' responsibility under international law. The International Court of Justice has stated that "the conduct of an organ of a state
-even an organ independent of the executive power-must be regarded as an
act of the state."' It also has pointed out in a recent case against the U.S. that
"the international responsibility of a state is engaged by the action of the
competent organs and authorities acting in that state, whatever they may be."9
NAFTA Article 105 confirms this fundamental rule of attribution, which also
is reflected in Article 4 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility, for purposes of NAFTA proceedings.
As the NAFTA Tribunal in ADF Group Inc. v. U.S.A. confirmed "the
established rule of customary international law that acts of all its governmental
organs and entities and territorial units are attributable to the [s]tate and that that
[s]tate as a subject of international law is, accordingly, responsible for the acts
of all its organs and territorial units." '0
Consequently, it is wholly unexceptionable for an international tribunal to
examine whether the decisions of the judicial organs of a state gave rise to a
violation of that state's obligations under international law, and hence triggered
its responsibility under international law.
B. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
When can an investor take action against a foreign state on the international plane? Under general international law, before pursuing an international claim, the claimant is bound to exhaust any local remedy that is
adequate and effective so long as the remedy is not obviously futile i.e., so long
as it is not clear in advance that the municipal courts of the state concerned will
not provide redress for the injured investor. This rule was confirmed in the
Ambatielos and Interhandel cases."

8.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29).
9.

LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3).
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See 23 I.L.R. 306 Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J., 27 I.L.R. 475 (Mar. 21).
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As we will see, the local remedies rule translates into a rule of judicial
finality in NAFTA cases that are based on a judicial act alleged to violate
international law.
C. Diversity of Nationality
As stated above, we are dealing here with the situation where a non-U.S.
claimant in an international (NAFTA) proceeding complains of a violation of
international law constituted by a U.S. judicial act. As is common in investorstate proceedings, NAFTA requires diversity of nationality as between a claimant and the respondent government. Therefore, in each NAFTA proceeding
the question must be asked: Is the NAFTA claimant truly a non-U.S. party? In
other words, who owns the claim? Mondev involved injury done directly to a
U.S. limited partnership fully owned by a Canadian company. Mondev brought
the NAFTA claim on its own behalf and not on behalf of its U.S. subsidiary. In
the view of the Mondev Tribunal: "It is true that these interests [relating to
Mondev's investment in the Boston project] were held by [Mondev's U.S.
subsidiary] LPA, but LPA itself was 'owned or controlled directly or indirectly'
by Mondev, and these interests were an 'investment or an investor of a Party'
as defined in Article 1139" of the NAFTA.12 The U.S. had urged the Tribunal
to pierce the corporate veil. The Tribunal found, however, that faced with the
NAFTA scheme, "there does not seem to be any room for the application of any
rules of international law dealing with the piercing of the corporate veil or with
derivative actions by foreign shareholders."' 3
In the Loewen case, Loewen had assigned its NAFTA claims to a Canadian
corporation owned and controlled by a U.S. corporation as part of a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Loewen Tribunal
warned: "IfNAFTA could be used to assert the rights of an American investor
in the instant case, it would in effect create a collateral appeal from the decision
of the Mississippi courts, by definition a unit of the U.S. government.' ' 14 In its
view: "[i]n international law parlance, there must be continuous national
identity from the date of the events giving rise to the claim, which date is known
as the dies a quo, through the date of the resolution of the claim, which date is
known as the dies ad quem."' 5 The problem is that NAFTA expressly requires
nationality only on the date of the submission of the claim, the treaty being
silent on the question of whether nationality must continue to the time of
resolution of the claim. The Loewen Tribunal adopted the rule of customary

12.

Mondevlnt'lLtd., 42 1.L.M. at 100.

13.

Id.

14.

Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 847.

15.

Id
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international law requiring continuous national identity, which it found to
emerge from U.S. non-espousal treaties.
The claim of one of the claimants, the Loewen Group, Inc., was dismissed
due to a lack of diversity of nationality following U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization as a U.S. corporation. This ruling will dissuade claimants from
changing their nationality at tactical points. 6
IV. EVALUATION OF NAFTA CASE LAW

Back to the critical issue at hand, i.e., the exhaustion of local remedies and
its treatment under the NAFTA case law. The Loewen Tribunal held that it
"cannot under the guise of a NAFTA claim entertain what is in substance an
appeal from a domestic judgment."' 7 It rightly pointed out that a "NAFTA
claim cannot be converted into an appeal against the decisions of municipal
courts"'" and that "the [s]tate is not responsible for the errors of its courts when
the decision has not been appealed to the court of last resort."' 9 Most
importantly, the Tribunal stated that:
the whole trial and its resultant verdict were clearly improper and
discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable treatment. However, because the
trial court proceedings are only part of the judicial process that is
available to the parties, the rest of the process,and its availabilityto
Loewen, must be examined before a violation of Article 1105 [of
20

NAFTA] is established.

As the Tribunal pointed out, however, the problem is that NAFTA "says
nothing expressly about the requirement that, in the context of a judicial
violation of international law, the judicial process be continued to the highest
level."'2' At the same time, "[n]or is there any basis for implying any dispensation of that requirement. '22 The Tribunal concluded that "Article 1121
involves no waiver of the duty to pursue local remedies in its application to a

16.
For an instructive ICSID case containing an elaborate discussion of the diversity of nationality
requirement and corporate nationality under international law, see Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine,ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/I 8 (2004), http.//www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm#award3O.
17.

Loewen Group, Inc, 42 I.L.M. at 819.

18.

Id. at 833.

19.

Id. at 834.

20.

Id. at 833 (emphasis added).

21.

Id. at 837.

22.

Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 837.
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breach of international law constituted by a judicial act.",2 3 It came up with its
own version of the international law rule requiring exhaustion of remedies: "It
is an obligation to exhaust remedies which are effective and adequate and are
reasonably24 available to the complainant in the circumstances in which it is
situated.
Given that Loewen had entered into a settlement agreement instead of
appealing the merits of its case, the Tribunal concluded:
[This] is not a case in which it can be said that it was the only course,
which Loewen could reasonably be expected to take. Accordingly,
our conclusion is that Loewen failed to pursue its domestic remedies,
notably the Supreme Court option.
In other words, it failed to file a petition for a writ of certiorariin the U.S.
Supreme Court. 25
Interestingly, the Tribunal attached the following postscript to its decision:
[W]e find nothing in NAFTA to justify the exercise by this Tribunal
of an appellate function parallel to that which belongs to the courts of
the host nation. In the last resort, a failure by that nation to provide
adequate means of remedy may amount to an international wrong but
only in the last resort. The line may be hard to draw, but it is real. 6
By contrast to the Canadian investor in Loewen, the investor in Mondev
did file an appeal and a petition for a writ of certioriin the U.S. Supreme Court,
and thus had exhausted all local remedies in that there was a final judicial act
of the municipal courts. The U.S. initially claimed that there was a lack of a
final judicial act, but it withdrew this objection later in the proceeding. As the
Tribunal pointed out:
It will be a matter for the investor to decide whether to commence
arbitration immediately, with the concomitant requirement under
Article 1121 of a waiver of any further recourse to any local remedies
in the host state, or whether initially to claim damages with respect to
the measure before the local courts.27

23.

Id. at 838.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.at 845 (emphasis added).

26.

Id.at 851.

27.

Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 I.L.M. at 103.
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In the circumstances, the Mondev Case turned on the question whether or
not there had been a denial of justice (the standard of treatment of aliens
applicable to decisions of the host state's courts or tribunals) under NAFTA
Article 1105(1). As the Tribunal stated:
It is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary
and another to second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest
courts of a state. Under NAFTA, parties have the option to seek local
remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits, it is not the function
of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal.28
The Tribunal cited another NAFTA case, Azinian v. United Mexican
States, which had held that a denial ofjustice may exist if:
a)
b)
c)
d)

The relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit;
There was undue delay in the relevant courts;
The relevant courts administered justice in a seriously
inadequate way; or
There was a clear and malicious misapplication of the law.29

The standard formulated by the Mondev Tribunal was the following:
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having
regard to generally accepted standards ofthe administration ofjustice,
a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the
impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the
result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable
treatment.30
The Loewen Tribunal cited this standard with approval. 1 These considerations by the Mondev and Loewen Tribunals are all perfectly sound from the
perspective of international law and should put to rest any concerns that
NAFTA tribunals might sit as courts of appeal over municipal decisions of
NAFTA member states.

28.

Id. at 109.

29.

See Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, 39 I.L.M. 537, 552

(2000).
30.

Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 l.L.M. at 110.

31.
See Loewen Group, Inc, 42 I.L.M. at 838. According to the Loewen Tribunal, "a court decision
which can be challenged through the judicial process does not amount to a denial ofjustice at the international
level." Id. at 836. "...the pursuit of local remedies plays a part in creating the ground of complaint that there
has been a breach of international law." Id. at 838.
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V. DISTINGUISHING THE FORK-IN-THE-ROAD PROBLEM
The situation examined here must be distinguished from that where an
investor attempts to have a "second bite at the apple" after having pursued
domestic proceedings, otherwise known as the "Fork-in-the-Road Problem."
This problem may be described as follows: If an investor has initiated domestic
litigation (or contractual arbitration) in respect of a particular dispute, does he
still have available the alternative of treaty arbitration in respect of that dispute?
By comparison, Article 26(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) stipulates
that, for Contracting Parties who are signatories of the ECTs Annex ID (an optout annex), consent to treaty arbitration is not given where the investor has
previously submitted the dispute to the courts of the Contracting Party or to a
previously agreed dispute settlement procedure. In other words, the ECT
prevents a party from pleading treaty breaches in two separate arbitrations. It
does not, however, bar a party from pleading contract breach at one time, and
treaty breach at another.3 2 The NAFTA claims discussed above all concerned
alleged breaches of NAFTA and customary international law.
It is true that NAFTA Article 1121 requires that the would-be claimant to
a NAFTA arbitration waive its "right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute
settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing [NAFTA] party that is alleged to be a breach" of Section A of NAFTAs
Chapter 11 and must desist from pursuing claims for damages in relation to such
measures. But that provision has nothing to do with the local remedies rule. On
the other hand, the rule of judicial finality is tied to the local remedies rule.
As the Loewen Tribunal explained, "[a]rticle 1121 involves no waiver of
the duty to pursue local remedies in its application to a breach of international
law constituted by a judicial act."33
In that scenario, "the pursuit of local remedies plays a part in creating the
ground of complaint that there has been a breach of international law." 34 On the
other hand, the Tribunal pointed out, "Article 1121 may have consequences
where a claimant complains of a violation of international law not constituted
by a judicial act.",31 It all depends on the essential basis of the cause of action
that is pleaded. As the ICSID Tribunal in Vivendi v. Argentine Republic held,
"[I]n a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an international

32.
See MichaelPolkinghorne,Investor-StateDisputeResolution Under The Energy CharterTreaty:
Which Fork? Which Road?, 19 MEALEY'S INT'L ARBITRATION REP. 13 (2004).
Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 838.
33.
34.

Id.

35.

Id.
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tribunal is a breach of contract, the tribunal will give effect to any valid choice
36
of forum clause in the contract.
Thus, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, an international claim for breach of treaty (such as NAFTA) and, on the other hand, a
breach of domestic legal obligations. As the ICSID Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan
pointed out: "the same set of facts can give rise to different claims grounded on
differing legal orders: the municipal and the international legal orders." 37 This
distinction is also reflected in Article 3 of the ILCs Articles on State Responsibility. NAFTA cases are restricted to the international legal order.
VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the above review of the decisions in the Mondev and Loewen
Cases, the conclusion is inescapable that there is no need for panic. These cases
do not present a jurisdictional conflict with U.S. courts. It should be kept in
mind that there is no de novo review in NAFTA proceedings. As the NAFTA
Tribunal in ADF Group, Inc. v. U.S.A. stated:
The Tribunal has no authority to review the legal validity and standing of the U.S. measures here in question under U.S. internal administrative law. We do not sit as a court with appellate jurisdiction with
respect to the U.S. measures. Ourjurisdiction is confined by NAFTA
Article 113 1(1)to assaying the consistency of the U.S. measures with
relevant provisions of NAFTA Chapter eleven and applicable rules
of international law.38
Recent state reluctance to accept that judicial acts may give rise to international claims under the NAFTA Chapter eleven scheme is redolent of arguments raised by Latin American states resorting to the Calvo Doctrine. As the
Loewen and Mondev decisions and those of ICSID tribunals demonstrate, nondomestic tribunals have not allowed, and should not allow, themselves to be
used for obtaining domestic relief not previously sought in the domestic courts.
The claims underlying these decisions were claims under international law for
violations of NAFTA. As long as NAFTA tribunals continue to adhere to a
strict interpretation of the local remedies/judicial finality and diversity of
nationality requirements along the lines of international law, there should be no
jurisdictional conflicts.
36.
Compania de Aguas Aconquija S.A v. Vivendi Universal, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
(2002), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/vivendi-annul.pdf.
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SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 42 I.L.M. 1290,
1313,1 147 (2003).
38.
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Investors will need to file a petition for certiorariin the U.S. Supreme
Court lest they find themselves struck out under NAFTA Chapter eleven based
on the non-fulfillment of the rule of judicial finality. Most importantly,
however, if the domestic courts (arguably) got it wrong under international law
and if the rule of judicial finality is satisfied, NAFTA remedies should be
available and such suits will not be frivolous or abusive.

